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Abstract—Distance Metric Learning (DML) has drawn much
attention over the last two decades. A number of previous
works have shown that it performs well in measuring the
similarities of individuals given a set of correctly labeled pairwise
data by domain experts. These important and precisely-labeled
pairwise data are often highly sensitive in real world (e.g.,
patients similarity). This paper studies, for the first time, how
pairwise information can be leaked to attackers during distance
metric learning, and develops differential pairwise privacy (DPP),
generalizing the definition of standard differential privacy, for
secure metric learning.
Unlike traditional differential privacy which only applies to
independent samples, thus cannot be used for pairwise data,
DPP successfully deals with this problem by reformulating the
worst case. Specifically, given the pairwise data, we reveal all the
involved correlations among pairs in the constructed undirected
graph. DPP is then formalized that defines what kind of DML
algorithm is private to preserve pairwise data. After that, a
case study employing the contrastive loss is exhibited to clarify
the details of implementing a DPP-DML algorithm. Particularly,
the sensitivity reduction technique is proposed to enhance the
utility of the output distance metric. Experiments both on a toy
dataset and benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed scheme
achieves pairwise data privacy without compromising the output
performance much (Accuracy declines less than 0.01 throughout
all benchmark datasets when the privacy budget is set at 4).
Index Terms—Pairwise data, differential privacy, metric learn-
ing, graph, gradient perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE distance/similarity between two samples (e.g., eu-clidean distance) is the base of many applications [1],
such as clustering, classification, information retrieval, etc.
Distance Metric Learning (DML) is a fundamental tool that
learns a distance metric over the data to support these ap-
plications. It expects that in the projected space the similar
samples would be better grouped; while the dissimilar ones
would be appropriately separated. Such a principle is properly
spoken of in [2] and much subsequent research [3]–[10] has
followed this criterion.
The training data fed to DML model is often pairwise
labelled1 which naturally encodes some secrets when the data
is collected from humans. A popular application of learning
distance metric would be healthcare data [11]–[13]. A pairwise
relationship in this application might be, for example, two
patients have the same/different disease(s). However, the rela-
tionships in the training data can be leaked to attackers through
J. Li, Y. Pan, Y, Sui, and I. W. Tsang are with the Centre for Artificial
Intelligence (CAI), University of Technology Sydney, Australia.
1This setting is called weakly supervised DML in some literature but is
overwhelming in metric learning community.
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Figure 1: Leakage of pairwise relationship. An attacker with all the
prior knowledge of the dataset except the target relationship between
Bob and Lam, is able to infer their real relationship by matching the
conjecture and query results.
a deterministic and resilient DML model. We give a white-
box attack example to explain a scenario that a traditional
DML model may unfortunately leak the pairwise relationship
to external attackers.
A privacy leakage scenario. Assume that we have a set of
pairwise medical records as the training data, a DML model
is trained over the entire pairwise data and returns a static
metric M∗ (e.g., oracle). Suppose that a powerful attacker
understands the DML model and has some prior knowledge,
i.e., knowing partial pairwise data of the entire training set (e.g.
K − 1, where K is the total number of pairs). The attacker
would like to exploit a particular relationship (e.g., Bob and
Lam) which the attacker does not know. First, she/he combines
the prior knowledge by checking two possible conjectures: (1)
Bob and Lam have the same disease, and (2) Bob and Lam
have different diseases. Then, the attacker feeds them to the
DML model separately and obtains corresponding conjecture
results M1 and M2. Lastly, she/he matches the two results
with the oracle M∗. The matched conjecture will expose the
correct pairwise relationship between Bob and Lam, leaking
the private relationship to the attacker. Fig. 1 depicts this
process.
Differential privacy. Differential Privacy (DP) [14] has
become a popular and widely accepted privacy framework in
recent years. It is initially used in data mining and data release
research community and recently moved to the machine learn-
ing community [15]. It aims to ensure that the participation
of an individual sample never changes the probability of any
possible outcome by much. This goal is usually achieved by
adding perturbation during modeling. As a result, the model
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Figure 2: Preserving privacy of pairwise relationship. Suppose the relationship between Alice and Bob is the target. The attacker may
have the prior knowledge that excludes edges with question mark. This provides one of the worst cases, where the relationship of Alice
and Bob cannot be inferred from prior knowledge. DPP ensures that the prior knowledge of the attacker for the worst case has the hardly
indistinguishable output with the original dataset. Particularly, the obtained metric M0 is expected to group training data as M1 does.
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Figure 3: Knowledge diagram. The prior knowledge is supposed
to be smaller than the whole data deducting the target pair because
of the data correlation. For a given target pair there always exists a
corresponding defensive boundary which restricts the volume of prior
knowledge in practice.
is able to protect against the powerful attackers who have
access to the whole dataset except the targeted sample. This
conclusion is derived from the DP’s assumption that all the
samples are independent, so that DP can defend the worst
case scenario, i.e., except the target sample, all the remaining
data (K-1 samples) are the prior knowledge of an attacker.
Unfortunately, this assumption is broken in pairwise data, even
if we treat a pair of data as a single sample. For example,
the disease relation between Alice and Bob in Fig. 2 can be
inferred by Jim since Jim has the same disease as both Alice
and Bob. Therefore, attackers does not need K-1 samples to
get the same prior knowledge as the worst case. In the pairwise
data setting, the worst case assumption (K-1 samples in an
attacker’s prior knowledge) in DP is not valid anymore. The
DP assumption, which can be seen as a defensive boundary for
securing pairwise privacy, needs to be redefined to understand
the defence capability of DP for pairwise data. This thought
is depicted as Fig. 3, where the defensive boundary would be
shrunk to the target pair’s boundary if data are independent.
Our solution. This paper studies, for the first time, how
pairwise information can be leaked to attackers under distance
metric learning scenario. By understanding the limitation of
DP’s assumption on prior knowledge when preserving the
privacy of pairwise data, we reformulate the worst case as-
sumption of DP for pairwise data by introducing an extended
privacy definition, namely Differential Pairwise Privacy (DPP).
A DML algorithm satisfying DPP can be described as Fig. 2,
where the input pairwise data altogether can be viewed as a
graph. Compared to the traditional DML algorithm, the novelty
of the proposed DML lies in the introduced randomness which
is used to compensate for the difference (i.e., a number of
edges in the graph) between the original dataset and the prior
knowledge of the attacker. Therefore, the randomized DML
is able to output hardly distinguishable distance metric no
matter which one is the input dataset, the original dataset or
the possible prior knowledge of the attacker for the worst case.
Consequently, no more useful information would be obtained
for the attacker by querying the randomized DML.
Contributions. The key contributions of our work are as
followings:
1) This paper presents DPP, a new privacy preserving
technique for pairwise data to secure distance metric
learning. From the view of problem optimization, this
work is shown as an important member in Empirical
Risk Minimization (ERM) family.
2) We analyze the gradient sensitivity via exploring the
distribution of pairs within a minibatch during the opti-
mization. It helps to enhance the utility of the released
3distance metric by reducing the amount of injected noise.
3) We exploit the connection of DPP with the existing
privacy research, and verify the efficacy of the proposed
scheme by numerous experiments.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. We present the
related work in Section II and introduce the preliminaries in
Section III. Then we state the secure metric learning problem
in Section IV, and formally define DPP in Section V. In
SectionVI, we implement a DML algorithm based on the con-
trastive loss, where we further propose a utility improvement
method. The experiments in Section VII are used to verify the
efficacy of the proposed scheme. Some interesting questions
are discussed in VIII. Finally, Section IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
We present the related works from two aspects, the possible
strategies for the privacy of pairwise data, and current privacy
implementation methods.
A. Privacy Strategies
Before diving into any specific privacy definitions, one may
ask why not directly hiding individual identity, because it
would immediately remove the privacy issues. Actually, this
so-called anonymization trick has been argued as unsafe and
inadequate in many previous works, such as [16] and [17].
The deficiency of anonymization is being vulnerable to the
auxiliary information. For example, the information extracted
from a social medium without name annotation is still possibly
recognized from some other social media data with name
annotation by comparison.
A feasible choice to preserve pairwise data is to leverage Lo-
cal Differential Privacy (LDP). For example, one can adopt the
coin flipping style approach [18] to probabilistically change
the relationship of any pair. In this case, any subsequently
surmised relationship for a data pair can be possibly denied,
such as [19]–[21]. If the privacy for individual feature is
needed, one can resort to the input perturbation like [22].
Unfortunately, LDP suffers the performance degeneration [21]
because it fails to takes the subsequent application into con-
sideration.
The closely related work is about studying the privacy of
correlated data. One pioneer work by Kifer et al. [23] pointed
out the correlated records definitely degrade the privacy level
if not specially treated. They then proposed a customizable
privacy framework Pufferfish [24] that requires the whole
algorithm should change an attacker’s prior distribution as
less as possible. Following this framework, Song et al. [25]
proposed a so-called Wasserstein mechanism. Recent graph
based privacy research [26]–[29] construct the relations among
individuals but mainly focus on the graphical statistics. Some
other works [30]–[32] in the data release community [33]–
[35] also noticed the detriment that data correlation brings in
and formalized diverse DP variants. However, we emphasize
that their claimed data correlation is virtually different from
pairwise data. For instance, [25] included the time series data
while [30] took the records distance into consideration. This
means correlation in existing research is actually individual to
individual. Instead, the correlation of pairwise data is caused
by one individual’s participation in multiple pairs. Therefore,
their schemes cannot be freely extended to our problem.
B. Privacy Implementation Methods
Given a specific privacy definition, current research suggests
implementing privacy by following three ways. (1) Output
perturbation. This method adds noise to the output of the
algorithm, which can be easily understood when the algorithm
is as simple as a database operator, like averaging the salary of
the employees in a company [36]. For some machine learning
models like classification or regression, [37], [38] give the
possible solutions. (2) Objective perturbation. By adding an
extra perturbed term in the objective, [37], [39]–[41] show
this strategy can works with a guarantee to the better model
utility. The perturbed term is usually not general for the other
objectives and needs some special considerations for different
models. (3) Gradient perturbation. This line of work manage
to perturb the gradient during the optimization, which has been
widely used in [38], [42]–[46]. This approach can be applied to
most machine learning models including deep neural networks.
We present the recipe of DP in machine learning via gradient
perturbation. It mainly consists of 4 components.
1) Privacy principle satisfying some requirements.
2) Loss function designed for the specific problem.
3) Upper bound for the gradient sensitivity.
4) Noise injection during optimization.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Notation: A pairwise datum is a tuple zij = (∆xij , yij),
where ∆xij = xi − xj (i 6= j,∆xij ∈ Rd) is the feature
difference between the individual i and j, and pairwise label
yij is a binary variable to encodes their relationship. Plus, xi
could also be any representation learned by deep embedding.
Omitting the subscript of zij whenever it clearly indicates a
single pair, we have Z = {z1, z2, ..., zK} is a dataset of K
pairwise data which are the input of a DML algorithm. For
a vector v, we use ||v||, ||v||2 to denote its `1-norm and `2-
norm, respectively. In a graph, we use 〈, 〉 to denote a pair of
nodes and use (, ) to denote an edge or a path.
Definition 1. (Edge-disjoint s-t paths) Given an undirected
graph and two nodes in it, source s and destination t, two
paths from s to t are said edge-disjoint if they do not share
any edge.
Definition 2. (Lipschitz function over model parameter θ) A
loss function f : C×Z → R (C,Z is parameter space and input
space separately.) is h-Lipschitz (under `1- norm) over θ, if
for any z ∈ Z and θ1, θ2 ∈ C, we have |f(θ1, z)−f(θ2, z)| ≤
h||θ1 − θ2||.
Definition 3. (-Differential Privacy [14]) A randomized al-
gorithm A is said to guarantee -differentially private if for
all datasets Z and Z ′ satisfying D(Z,Z ′) = 1 (Z ′ is called
the neighboring dataset of Z , and D(, ) means the number of
records two datasets differ.) and for any possible algorithm
output o the following holds:
Pr[A(Z) = o] ≤ e · Pr[A(Z ′) = o], (1)
4where Pr[·] is w.r.t. the randomness in A, and the non-negtive
parameter  is known as privacy budget.
Sensitivity based methods for -DP leverage the Laplace
Mechanism [36] which has the following definitions.
Definition 4. (`1-sensitivity) The `1-sensitivity of a function
g : Z → Rd is:
∆g = max
D(Z,Z′)=1
‖g(Z)− g(Z ′)‖. (2)
Definition 5. (Laplace Mechanism) Given a function g : Z →
Rd, the Laplace Mechanism MLap is defined as:
MLap(Z, g, ) = g(Z) + Y, (3)
where Y is drawn from Laplace distribution Lap(0, b) with
b = ∆g . Laplace Mechanism preserves -differentially private.
Remark. Definition 3 can be relaxed to the approximate DP
according to [36] if Definitions 2-5 are properly modified.
The proposed DPP can be also relaxed with the same style.
We leave these analyses to Appendix C for a supplemental
discussion.
Distance Metric Learning. DML aims to learn a
representative distance between i and j defined by
DM (i, j) =
√
∆xTijM∆xij , where M ∈ Rd×d is the
distance metric, a.k.a., a symmetric positive semidefinite
matrix. The original form of M refers to the case where i and
j are drawn from the same distribution with covariance matrix
Σ, with M = Σ−1. According to the literature [5]–[10], [47],
this metric can be better learned once the pairwise labels
are provided. Practically, pairwise label is often denoted
as a binary variable yij ∈ {0, 1} to indicate category. For
instance, if two samples i and j are from the same class, then
yij = 0, and if they are from different classes, yij = 1. Let
M = WTW , where the transformation matrix W ∈ Rd′×d
(1 ≤ d′ ≤ d) is free of any constraint. As a result, W can
be optimized by minimizing the projected distance between
similar samples while maximizing the distance between
dissimilar ones.
IV. PROBLEM UNDERSTANDING
A. Insights
Since the pairwise data encodes the interpersonal relation-
ship, preserving the privacy of involved pairwise relationship
is the core problem in this work. The algorithm designer is
thought as the trusted party, and thus the whole dataset can be
directly fed into the algorithm, i.e., DML. The user is returned
an available distance metric after they submit a query to the
system (DML algorithm). To prevent any potential attacks in
this setting, the algorithm designer is responsible to develop a
DML algorithm which guarantees the privacy of every pairwise
relationship.
Practically, we are playing the role of the algorithm de-
signer. Inspired by [24], we adopt the following principle to
preserve pairwise relationship. If an attacker fails to infer
the target relationship through her/his prior knowledge,
she/he cannot obtain more information by querying the
DML algorithm either. Based on this principle, we have three
key insights.
1) Defending against the attacks that need query. If a
targeted sample can be inferred through its relations with
other samples in the prior knowledge of the attacker,
privacy preserving techniques, e.g., DP, would never
be possible to defend the attacks. Therefore, as the
algorithm designer, we are supposed to recognize and
formulate the maximum prior knowledge of an attacker,
and prevent them knowing more about data during
their interactions with the DML algorithm. In contrast,
the users who can already infer the target relationship
through their prior knowledge is outside of our scope,
because they do not need to query a DML algorithm
output.
2) Preserving both feature difference and pairwise label.
We are motivated by preserving the privacy of pairwise
relationship, i.e., yij , the last element of the tuple zij ,
similar to Attribute DP introduced in [23]. Unfortu-
nately, it is actually not adequate to solely preserve
yij . Recalling the goal of DML, the distance change
between two individuals reflects their relationship. For
instance, two samples close to each other but far away in
the projected space are likely labeled as dissimilar, i.e.,
||∆xij || is small while DM (i, j) is large. As our task is
to return an available distance metric, we have to hide
the information of ∆xij to avert this kind of leakage.
Therefore, we conclude that to achieve the privacy of
any pairwise relationship between i and j, the privacy
concern for ∆xij and yij are both needed. Please note
it is not equal to preserving a single tuple zij , and see
Section V-A for more details.
3) Enhancing the utility by introducing randomness as less
as possible. Existing works [37]–[44], [46] applying DP
in machine learning algorithms have shown introducing
randomness to the machine learning model is provable to
preserve the data privacy (Refer to the recipe in Section
III). Compared to DP in which randomness is only
used to compensate the change of any single sample,
the privacy cost for pairwise data is apparently higher
because there are more than one pair’s change needs
compensating. As a result, the utility of output distance
metric is decreased. This problem is alleviated by using a
sensitivity reduction technique (See section VI-B) which
reduces the amount of injected noise.
B. Clarification
We clarify two peculiar properties of DML in this part.
Transitive vs intransitive relationship. Pairwise labels have
different semantics in different context, and we notice that
they are not consistent when considering their correlations.
Summarily, there are mainly two types of pairwise relation-
ship; one is transitive and the other is intransitive. Transitive
relationship is like having the same disease or working in
the same company, and intransitive relationship is like being
friends or hanging out together. In the main body of this
paper, we focus on the transitive relationship and attribute
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Figure 4: Comparison between the samples fed to classification or
regression models and pairwise data fed to DML algorithms. Left:
Any two samples composed of the feature xi (xj) and its label li (lj)
are independent in existing ERM-based works. Right: Pairwise data
are correlated with each other because an individual may participate
in multiple pairs.
intransitive relationship as its special case. It is reasonable
because transitive relationship requires more privacy concern
for the transitivity risks. Please note the naive edge differential
privacy (edge DP) [27], [28] is not applicable even for the
intransitive relationship. We leave the analysis of intransitive
relationship to Appendix B.
DML vs classification/regression. A formulated DML loss
function can be seen as an instance of ERM-based [48] model.
From this view, the transitivity property of pairwise data makes
DML distinct from existing privacy works for classification
and regression [37], [42], [45], [46]. Fig. 4 exhibits their
comparison over input data. Concretely, any two data points
fed to existing ERM-based models are usually independent
with each other, which naturally matches the DP definition. For
pairwise data, the dependence happens due to the correlation
both on feature differences and pairwise labels indicated as
edge on the right of Fig. 4. Please note although two types of
correlation are caused by the same reason, they are virtually
not the identical problem. The specific details are discussed in
Section V.
V. DIFFERENTIAL PAIRWISE PRIVACY FROM GRAPH
PERSPECTIVE
Denoting each individual as a node and every pairwise data
zij as an edge, we arrive at an undirected graph G = (V,E).
Please note the node set V only keeps the identity of individ-
uals while the edge set contains all the information used for
DML training, i.e., E = {zij = (∆xij , yij)|(i, j ∈ V 2 ∧ i 6=
j}. Thus, we can see that all the privacy burden is on edges.
Based on this graph, Differential Pairwise Privacy (DPP) is
presented in this section. We will show this definition is a
nontrivial extension of DP (a.k.a. edge DP in the context of
graph data) over the pairwise data.
A. Privacy Concern on Edge
Let 〈s, t〉 denote the target pair whose pairwise relationship
is the interest of the attacker. According to the statement in
Section IV-A, given the original graph G, we need to formulate
the prior knowledge G′ of the attacker.
Pairwise relationship correlation. For binary category case,
we summarize there are three basic relationship inference
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Figure 5: Construction of neighboring graph w.r.t. the pair 〈s, t〉.
(I) The graph encoding all the pairwise data. (II) Disjoint-edge
identification. (III) Two key edges (s, c) and (s, t) determining the
relationship inference. (IV) Edge (b, s) exposing the feature of the
individual s.
patterns2. Let ∼, denote that two individuals are from
identical and different categories respectively, and C is the
category number. We have
• s ∼ i, i ∼ t⇒ s ∼ t
• s ∼ i, i  t⇒ s  t
• s  i, i  t⇒ s ∼ t (iff C = 2)
Thus, we conclude that where there is a path between two
nodes there might be a possible inference exposing their
relationship. That is to say, for a target pair 〈s, t〉, all the
paths between s and t provide useful inferences. According
to Menger’s Theorem [49], the least cost of preventing these
inferences is properly breaking down |Pst| edges, where Pst
is the set of all edge-disjoint s-t paths. We use an example
shown as Fig. 5 to clarify this thought. Fig. 5 (I) shows the
derived graph G formed by the given pairs. Inspecting the
nodes s and t, we find there are totally three paths from s to
t, i.e., (s, t), (s, c, e, t), and (s, c, u, t). We select two of them
as edge-disjoint paths which are marked as red and green line
respectively in the Fig. 5 (II). Obviously, an instant way to
prevent the inference is to break the key edges, i.e., (s, c) and
(s, t), shown as the dashed edges in the Fig. 5 (III).
Feature difference correlation. According to linear algebra,
when an individual is included in a circle, its feature can be
calculated since the degree of freedom equals to the number of
constraints (i.e., edges). As shown in Fig. 5 (IV), the feature
of s is exposed once the information of edges (s, a), (a, b)
and (b, s) is known. As hiding the feature of either s or t
is adequate to privatize ∆xst, one of the possible options
is to delete the edge (b, s) in this example. It is observed
that breaking down the edge-disjoint paths sometimes help
decrease the cycles used for feature inference, e.g., s is also
in the cycle (s, c, e, t, s). Thus, the edges determining ∆xst
inference are only searched in the subgraph G − Pst, i.e.,
removing all edges belonging to Pst from G. Let cs, ct denote
the number of edges that isolate the nodes s and t from
2The number of inference patterns are actually determined by the category
number, but even so we can still come to the consistent conclusion if similar
pairs are dominant in the correlations.
6the possible cycles over G−Pst, respectively. The minimum
number of edges we should delete is min{cs, ct}.
Summarily, it is concluded that the attacker who targets
the relationship between s and t should at least miss |Pst|+
min(cs, ct) edges in G. This quantitative measure actually
generalizes the attacker’s prior knowledge but makes it easy
to do formulation. As any pair is the potential target pair, the
attacker’s prior knowledge G′ should satisfy
D(G,G′) ≥ κ, (4)
where D(, ) means the number of edges two graph differs, and
the introduced variable κ is calculated by
κ = max
∀s,t∈V,s6=t
{|Pst|+ min(cs, ct)}. (5)
Particularly, we name G′ as κ-neighboring graph of G if the
equality exactly holds in Eq. (4).
B. Differential Pairwise Privacy
Given a graph G, we name the attacker as κ-Att if her/his
prior knowledge is exactly κ-neighboring graph of G. An
attacker with fewer edges prior, i.e., D(G,G′) > κ, is unable
to know more than κ-Att, while an attacker knowing more
edges, i.e., D(G,G′) < κ, is likely to have known the target
pair without any need of querying the DML algorithm. Thus,
κ-Att defines the worst case for pairwise data.
From Eq. (5), κ is only determined by the given dataset.
Although searching the exact value of κ is not an interactive
component of the DML algorithm, it is very challenging to
compute in reality. To overcome this dilemma we propose an
alternative approach to effectively calculate the value of κ.
The details are left to Appendix A for the interested readers.
Suppose κ is known, based on the above analyses, we now
give the definition of differential pairwise privacy.
Definition 6. (-Differential Pairwise Privacy (DPP)). A ran-
domized DML algorithm ADML is said to guarantee -
differentially pairwise privacy if for all datasets G,G′ sat-
isfying D(G,G′) = κ and for any possible output oM the
following holds:
Pr[ADML(G) = oM ] ≤ e · Pr[ADML(G′) = oM ]. (6)
DPP takes good advantages of DP for pairwise data. More
importantly, we present its two valuable peculiarities.
• Bearing individual participation. Our definition poten-
tially allows attacker to have prior knowledge about
the participation of the target individuals. We de facto
privatize the participation of their pairwise relationship,
i.e., the connected edge. This is consistent with common
sense. For instance, if an attacker wants to know whether
Alice and Bob have the same disease, he/she must know
they are contained in the target dataset.
• Defending implicit attacks. No assumption is made to
the given pairwise labeled dataset. In practice, the data
are often collected and labelled by some domain experts
who may be agnostic to the involved privacy issues. As
algorithm designers are the trusted party, it is their re-
sponsibility to consider the possible pairwise data leakage
risks. We have shown the proposed DPP is a feasible
definition to deal with the risks.
VI. DPP-DML ALGORITHM DESIGN
According to the recipe of DP in Section III, since a new
privacy definition for pairwise data is built up, we now apply
it to a specific DML algorithm. In this section, we make
contrastive loss [6], [10], [50] a case study to present the
details about how to design a DML algorithm that exactly
satisfies Definition 6. Then we further improve the utility of the
DML algorithm while keeping its intact privacy by proposing
the sensitivity reduction approach.
A. Case Study with Contrastive Loss
Contrastive loss is a classic DML model which measures
pairwise data in a projected space for better fitting the pairwise
labels. For simplicity, zij = (∆xij , yij) is denoted by z =
(∆x, y), and the loss function is written as
L(W, z) =
1
2
(1− y)D2W +
1
2
y{max(0,m−DW )}2, (7)
where W is the transformation matrix, DW = ‖W∆x‖2 is the
distance of data point i, j in the projected space, and m > 0
is a margin threshold used for avoiding collapsed solutions.
We follow the gradient perturbation approach applied in
[42], [43], [45] to implement the privacy of DML algorithm.
The consideration behind this approach is that gradient compu-
tation is the unique component of DML algorithm that interacts
with the input data.
As each row of W is independent, the gradient w.r.t Wr(r =
1, 2, ..., d′) is
gr(z) =

Wr∆x∆x
T y = 0
DW−m
DW
Wr∆x∆x
T y = 1, DW < m
0 y = 1, DW ≥ m
. (8)
Before further computing the gradient sensitivity, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a pair (∆x, y), the gradient function ‖gr(·)‖
is infinite if only if y = 0 and ‖Wr‖ is unbounded.
Proof. If y = 0 and ‖Wr‖ → ∞, clearly ‖gr(·)‖ will be
infinite.
If y = 1 and DW ≥ m, ‖gr(·)‖ = 0.
If y = 1 and DW < m, we have
‖gr(·)‖ = |1− m‖W∆x‖2 | · ‖Wr∆x∆x
T ‖
1
≤ m‖Wr∆x∆x
T ‖
1√
d′
‖W∆x‖ − ‖Wr∆x∆x
T ‖
2
≤ m
√
d′|Wr∆x| · ‖∆xT ‖
‖W∆x‖
3
≤ 2m
√
d′.
(9)
where 1 follows the fact that for any vector u ∈ Rd′
‖u‖1 ≤
√
d′‖u‖2. 2 utilizes the facts that every induced
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Figure 6: Gradient sensitivity reduction w.r.t. minibatch data. Left:
Individuals are `1 normalized. The cyan line segment denotes the
factor 2h specified by Theorem 1. pmax is the one of all batch
members whose gradient value is the largest, q denotes the possible
counterpart of pmax in the neighboring batch that satisfies Eq.
(12). The orange line segment connecting pmax and q is likely
shorter than the cyan one. Right: Individuals are `2 normalized,
and representation are consistent with the left. This subfigure is also
specified by Corollary 1 in Appendix C.
norm is submultiplicative, i.e., ‖Wr∆x∆xT ‖ ≤ ‖Wr∆x‖ ·
||∆xT ||, and second term is non-negative. 3 follows the fact
‖Wr∆x‖ ≤ ‖W∆x‖ and triangle inequality, i.e., ‖∆x‖ ≤
‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2‖xj‖ ≤ 2 where xi is `1 normalized.
Summarizing above results, we complete the proof.
From Lemma 1 we can see gr(·) is bounded if ‖Wr‖ is
smaller than a const. A tender option is to impose some
restriction on W . For example, Jin et al. [51] employed a
regularizer to measure the complexity of W . Yet, it fails to
bound the gradient during the entire optimization. As a result,
the sensitivity of gradient gr(·) will be infinite according to
Definition 4. Chaudhuri et al. [37] averted this difficulty by
constraining the objective to be h-Lipschitz, which is simply
achieved by the gradient clipping technique [45]. We follow
their schemes and formulate a new theorem.
Theorem 1. If the objective function in Eq. (7) is h-Lipschitz
w.r.t. Wr, the `1 gradient sensitivity ∆gr on a minibatch B is
at most 2κh|B| , where κ is specified by Eq. (4).
Theorem 1 is a direct extension to the Corollary 8 of [37].
Remark. With this gradient sensitivity, we can subsequently
make DML algorithm satisfy Definition 6 by adding the noise
sampled from the distribution Lap(0, 2κh|B| ) to the iterative
batch gradient. Particularly, according to [42], the whole DML
algorithm will satisfy  pure DPP if every batch is disjoint.
B. Improvement by Sensitivity Reduction
The amount of injected noise to gradient is determined by
the gradient sensitivity. To improve the utility of optimization
algorithm, an instant option is to reduce the gradient sensitivity
value. Keeping this thought in mind we propose a gradient
sensitivity reduction approach by exploring the distribution of
pairs within a minibatch during the optimization.
Since we locally add noise to every batch gradient, it
does not cost much to adjust the sensitivity in a minibatch.
Specifically, the sensitivity based method aims to find the
maximum difference between the given batch and its any
Algorithm 1 DPP-DML Algorithm
Input: Dataset Z containing K tuples
Parameter: Reduced dimension d′, margin threshold m,
Lipschitz constant h, the distance κ, batch size |B|, privacy
budget , epoch number Tmax
Output: Distance metric M
1: Initialize transformation matrix W randomly, step size
η = 1, counter τ = 0, batch index itbat = K|B| , privacy
budget for an epoch ′ = Tmax
2: for T = 1, 2, ..., Tmax do
3: for it = 1, 2..., itbat do
4: τ ← τ + 1
5: η ← η√
τ
6: for r = 1, 2, ..., d′ do
7: Compute gradient gr(·) w.r.t each pj ∈ Bit by
Eq. (8) and then do gradient clipping gr(pj) =
gr(pj)/max(1,
‖gr(pj)‖
h )
8: Compute g′r = max(gr(p1), gr(p2), ..., gr(p|B|))
9: Compute g′′r = min{h,max(4||Wr||, 2m
√
d′)}
10: Add noise g∗r =
1
|B|
∑
j gr(pj) + Lap(
κ∆gr
′ ),
where ∆gr =
g′r+g
′′
r
|B|
11: Wr ←Wr − ηg∗r
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
15: M = WT ∗W
possible neighbor over the gradient value. If κ = 1, our goal is
equivalent to find out which pair is the most sensitive among
a group of batch members. We present an example in a two-
dimensional space shown as Fig. 6, where pmax denotes the
pair (regardless of its label dimension) who has the maximum
gradient value. Without loss of generality, we suppose the
larger distance between two pairs, the more different their
gradients will be. Thus, Theorem 1 actually employs the
biggest sensitivity value represented by cyan segment. In the
presented case, pmax is the most sensitive pair because it
has the largest possible distance to the `1 norm boundary
compared to other pairs. Pair q represents the farthest pair
possibly occurring in the neighboring batch. That means the
sensitivity value is determined by the distance of pmax and q.
Inspired by this observation, we propose gradient sensitivity
reduction approach. In the followings, instead of tuple z we
abuse p as a pair within a batch for the input of gradient
function.
Theorem 2. If the objective function in Eq. (7) is h-Lipschitz
w.r.t. Wr, the `1 gradient sensitivity ∆gr on any batch B is at
most κ(g
′
r+g
′′
r )
|B| , where κ is specified by Eq. (4), the batch
gradient peak g′r = max(||gr(p1)||, ..., ||gr(p|B|)||), and its
possible counterpart g′′r = min{h,max(4||Wr||, 2m
√
d′)}.
Proof. The worst case is that two neighbouring are exactly
different by the constraint ‖B − B′‖ = κ. Since the pair sat-
isfying y = 1 and DW ≥ m has no contribution to the batch
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Figure 7: DML projects original data into a new space. (a) A synthetic dataset containing 200 data points drawn from two aligned strips.
(b)-(d) Data distribution after applying the metric learned by contrastive loss with DPP, DPP-S (with sensitivity reduction), and NonPriv
concern, respectively.
gradient, `1 sensitivity of gr(·) can be written as
∆gr = max || 1|B| (gr(B)− gr(B
′))||
≤ max
j
κ
|B| ||(gr(pj)− gr(pj
′))|| (j = 1, 2, ..., |B|)
≤ κ|B| (||(gr(pmax)||+ ||gr(q))||).
(10)
Let g′r := max(||gr(p1)||, ..., ||gr(p|B|)||), and we have
||gr(pmax)|| = g′r ≤ h. (11)
Meanwhile, according to the proof of Lemma 1 we have
||DW−mDW Wr∆x∆xT || ≤ 2m
√
d′. As ||Wr∆x∆xT || ≤
4||Wr||, the following inequality must always hold
||gr(q)|| ≤ min{h,max(4||Wr||, 2m
√
d′)} := g′′r . (12)
Therefore, we arrive at
∆gr ≤ κ(g
′
r + g
′′
r )
|B| , (13)
which completes the proof.
Remark. Clearly we have g′r = h if full batch gradient
descent is applied. Otherwise, the proposed approach takes
advantage of the difference between g′r and h. Please note
a minibatch is usually collected from a component of G
(G could be disconnected) according to [8], [9], instead of
globally sampling over the entire dataset D. Thus, g′r is diverse
across different batches. It is noted that sensitivity reduction
trick also benefits from the difference between g′′r and h.
The reason is that the gradient function of contrastive loss
is piecewise different. We attribute this point to the property
of DML loss function.
Combining with the steps of optimizing the contrastive loss,
we summarize the entire process into Algorithm 1 which
naturally satisfies Definition 6. For Laplacian mechanism, it
is known that V ar(||gr||) ∝ (∆gr′ )2, where ′ is the fixed
privacy budget for each minibatch. This means the smaller
sensitivity factually implies the better utility of gradient. From
the composition theory [52], the privacy budget for an epoch
is still ′. Particularly, once Tmax epochs are needed for better
convergence, then the accumulated privacy budget should be
 = ′Tmax.
VII. EXPERIMENT
This section contains four parts. In the first part, the efficacy
of the proposed method is validated on a synthetic dataset.
In the second part, based on the same privacy mechanism,
i.e., Laplace mechanism, we further compare with other two
methods on four real-world benchmarks. Their performance
is evaluated by classification accuracy on the test set. By
replacing the based privacy mechanisms we demonstrate the
effectiveness of sensitivity reduction in the third part. In the
last part, we investigate the effects of different parameters.
Through all the experiments, the `1-norm of every sample is
preprocessed smaller than 1 before used to compute the feature
difference. To guarantee the convergence, all the stochastic
algorithms follow the step size update rule in Algorithm 1,
which typically enforces the conditions
∑
τ η(τ) = ∞ and∑
τ η
2(τ) ≤ ∞.
A. Toy Example
We use the synthetic dataset introduced in [53] as a toy
example for DML training. As shown in Fig. 7a, raw data are
composed of two classes, each of which is single-Gaussian
distributed and contains 100 points. By trickily selecting 50
intra-class pairs within each class and 50 inter-class pairs,
we obtain an undirected acylic graph. In this experiment,
contrastive loss is optimized with NonPriv, DPP, and DPP-S
(DPP with sensitivity reduction) concern separately. To verify
their capacities, in this toy example, we suppose the original
data is accessible.
During the optimization, we empirically set  = 2, m = 1,
h = 0.5, |B| = 30, and Tmax = 10. Fig. 7b-7d show the
transformed data using the distance metrics learned by three
privacy schemes, respectively. For the convenient comparison,
the transformed data are exhibited in the same range map,
[0.08, 0.32] horizontally, and [0.19, 0.45] vertically. Appar-
ently, each of them now has the clearer structure than original
data. It is noticed that optimization with DPP-S is very close to
NonPriv result. That means the sensitivity reduction technique
improves fidelity of output distance metric.
To better understand the above observations, we present
the convergence curves of each solution shown as Fig. 8a. It
is seen that NonPriv converge steadily among three methods
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Figure 8: (a) The objective values of Eq. (7) versus iteration number
with NonPriv, DPP and DPP-S, respectively. (b) The sensitivity value
2κh
|B| specified by Theorem 1 and reduced sensitivity specified by
Theorem 2 (exhibited by each dimension) versus iteration number.
Table I: Statistics of datasets
Dataset Records (n) Dime. Pos./Neg. Pairs
Adult 48,842 124 18,700/18,700
Bank 45,211 33 8,464/8,464
IPUMS-BR 38,000 53 30,016/30,016
IPUMS-US 40,000 58 31,104/31,104
as its every iterative step is assigned with a clean gradient.
Compared to DPP that uses the vanilla gradient sensitivity,
the objective value of DPP-S decreases faster and has slighter
fluctuation. Particularly, DPP seems to need more rounds to
converge to a steady point. It is consistent with our expectation
because more noises are injected in this privacy scheme. In
addition, we notice that NonPriv objective value is not strictly
lower than DPP-S. The reason is that the perturbation to the
gradient sometimes provides diverse exploration directions.
However, the optimization cannot benefit from random per-
turbations in a long period. Moreover, we investigate the
sensitivity value of each row of the transformation matrix
W , shown as Fig. 8b. During a quantity of iterations, the
sensitivity value after reduction is dramatically lower than
the standard one referred in Lemma 1. We demonstrate the
sensitivity reduction mitigates the utility degeneration caused
by a huge amount of redundant noise.
B. Comparison on Real-world Datasets
Four datasets about humans are employed here following
the setting of recent work [54]: (i) Adult [55] is extracted
from the 1994 Census database which contains the instances
of personal income information. (ii) Bank [55] is related
with direct marketing campaigns of a Portuguese banking
institution. (iii) IPUMS-BR and (iv) IPUMS-US datasets are
also about Census data collected from IPUMS-International
[56]. For imbalanced dataset (Adult and Bank), we simply
downsample the majority class during training. Table I briefly
summarizes the statistics of these datasets.
Since there is not any direct solution applying to the
proposed secure metric learning problem, we borrow the idea
of Node DP [57] and ERM-based input perturbation (denoted
by InputPer for short) [22] thought as two competing methods.
The former defends against the attacker who is unknown as
many as the maximum node degree edges, which is shown as
the worst case of DPP according to the analysis in Appendix
A. The latter assumes that data collector is also not reliable
that guarantees a stronger privacy. The advantage of InputPer
for pairwise data preserving is that no special consideration is
needed for the pair correlations, because any inference is now
unreliable. Throughout all the involved randomized algorithm,
Laplace mechanism is used to extract noise. In particular,
for InputPer method, the laplacian noise is added to every
dimension over feature, while the label is randomly flipping
by Warner’s model [18]. To prevent κ being too large, we
empirically label the pairwise data with the fixed density of
constructed graph, i.e., |E||V | = 2. Batch size and Lipschiz const
are set as |B| = 50 and h = 0.5 respectively. For different
datasets, the margin m is preset as the average distance of
dissimilar pairs, i.e., m = 1KN
∑ ||∆x||, where KN is the
number of dissimilar pairs. The output distance metric is then
evaluated by classification accuracy. Specifically, the distance
metric M is firstly decomposed into transformation matrix
W , and W projects original data into a new space. Then a
kNN classifier (k = 5) is trained on the samples that are only
employed in training pairs, and all the remaining samples are
regarded as the test set. Last but not least, every method is
repeated for 20 times and the average classification accuracy
is eventually reported.
Fig. 9 shows the classification results comparison versus
different privacy budgets. At the first glance, the classification
accuracy of every randomized method rises steadily with
the increment of privacy budget. It is apparent because less
noise is injected to the gradient and the precision of distance
metric is improved with the same iterative steps. As Node
DP injects more noise than the proposed DPP during each
iteration, we find that its accuracy is always lower than
DPP. Furthermore, DPP with sensitivity reduction, i.e. DPP-
S, effectively enhances the accuracy, especially on Adult and
IPUMS-US datasets. We observe that in most cases, InputPer
shows the worst performance, because InputPer is agnostic to
the downstreaming application. Interestingly, it outperforms
other competitors on IPUMS-US dataset when  is not large.
A reasonable explanation is that the dataset distance κ or
maximum node degree is sometimes large (determined by
randomly labelled pairwise data) in other three methods, which
results in a great amount injected noise in optimization, while
InputPer is not influenced by these factors.
C. Privacy Mechanisms Comparison
Besides Laplace mechanism (and its sensitivity reduction
version), we employ two more -DP mechanisms as the alter-
natives during implementing DPP. Soria-Comas and Domingo-
Ferr [58] proposed a staircase-like mechanism which is a
variant of Laplace mechanism. Duchi et al. [59] proposed
a method to perturb multidimensional numeric tuples. For
convenience, these four mechanisms are orderly denoted by
Lap, Lap-S, SCDF, and Duchi separately. We compare them
by replacing the gradient perturbation component and record
their objective values after an epoch optimization. Obviously,
the smaller objective values indicates better convergence. For
simplicity we only do this group of experiments on Adult and
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Figure 9: Classification accuracy of compared methods versus privacy budget  over four real-world datasets.
0.5   1   2   4
103
104
105
O
bje
cti
ve
 V
alu
e
NonPriv
Duchi
SCDF
Lap
Lap-S
(a) Adult
0.5   1   2   4
102
103
104
O
bje
cti
ve
 V
alu
e
NonPriv
Duchi
SCDF
Lap
Lap-S
(b) Bank
Figure 10: Different -DP mechanisms comparison in implementing
DPP through their objective values.
Bank datasets. The involved parameters setting follows Section
VII-B.
Fig. 10 presents the objective values of Eq. (7) when
different privacy mechanisms are employed. On both two
datasets, we observe that SCDF converges faster than Lap.
This is because SCDF benefits from an adjustable parameter
controlling staircase width in Laplace mechanism. Staircase
width is a function of both sensitivity and privacy budget.
Thus, it has the potential to add less noise than Lap that
enhances the utility. In addition, with the use of reduced
sensitivity trick, we find that Lap-S converges fastest in all
mechanism members. Duchi performs worst in this experiment
compared with other sensitivity based mechanisms. Specif-
ically, all the mechanisms are extracting unbiased noise, but
the variance of Duchi for one-dimension data is ( e
+1
e−1 )
2 while
the variance is 4h
2
|B|22 for Lap. If we take h = 0.5, |B| = 50
and  = 1, Duchi’s variance is around 10,000 times larger than
Lap’s!
D. Effects of Parameters
We simply demonstrate the effects of involved parameters
Lipschitz constant h, batch size |B|, margin threshold m, and
reduced dimension d′ on Bank dataset.
To properly clip the gradient in each step, we need a good
Lipschitz constant h, because either a smaller or larger h
would cause the slower convergence of optimization. On the
one hand, if h is too small, then most of gradients will be
clipped, and thus the objective converges slowly. On the other
hand, if h is too large, the sensitivity value will be large
according to Theorem 2, and consequently the amount of noise
is increased in each step optimization. In this experiment, let
 = 4 and Tmax = 3, we investigate the objective curves under
different values of h. The experimental results are shown as
Fig. 11a. We can observe the objective converges faster when
h = 0.5. Particularly, when h = 2, the objective value initially
increases within the a few of steps and then decreases steadily.
It is because the step size is large at the beginning of the
optimization, which amplifies the imprecise gradient caused
by a relatively large h.
Similar to Lipschitz constant h, according to Theorems
1 and 2, the batch size is also related to the convergence
rate of the algorithm. We do grid search for |B| and all
of them are conducted for same epochs, i.e., Tmax = 3.
The results are shown as Fig. 11b. When the batch size is
larger, the total optimized steps are smaller, and vice versa.
As |B| = 50 reaches the lowest objective value within the
limited epochs, we empirically accept it as the default setting
in other experiments.
The margin threshold m is a hyperparameter for contrastive
loss. Instead of manually fixing it, we connect it with the
average distance of dissimilar pairs, i.e., m = ρKN
∑ ||∆x||,
where ρ serves as a ratio factor. In this experiment, we tune
m by changing the value of ρ for NonPriv. Since the objective
value is a function of m, we search ρ by evaluating the
corresponding testing accuracy. Fig. 11c shows the accuracy
comparison. Although ρ = 2 obtains the best performance, the
accuracy of ρ = 1 is only slightly lower than the best result.
Thus, we simply use the naive average distance in all of other
experiments.
A distance metric can be decomposed into transformation
matrix, which projects the original data into different dimen-
sional space, a.k.a. dimension reduction. Fig. 11d presents the
testing accuracy result versus different reduced dimensions.
The highest accuracy is obtained when d′ = 16, and the
projection without dimension reduction (d′ = 32) is close to
the best performance. Interestingly, it is observed that with
the decrease of dimension, the variance of testing accuracy
increases significantly. We conclude most of features are
contributive in this dataset and each category data are likely
discriminative when more dimensions are kept.
11
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Iteration
102
103
O
bje
cti
ve
 V
alu
e
(a) Lipschitz constant
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Iteration
102
103
104
O
bje
cti
ve
 V
alu
e
(b) Batch size
0.25  0.5    1    2    4    8
0.946
0.948
0.95
0.952
0.954
0.956
0.958
0.96
0.962
0.964
Ac
cu
ra
cy
NonPriv
(c) Margin threshold
 1  2  4  8 16 32
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
NonPriv
DPP-S
(d) Dimension reduction
Figure 11: Effects of several key parameters on Bank dataset.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Although we have made contrastive loss a case study in
this paper, it is believed that the proposed DPP serves as
a generalized privacy definition for metric learning, such as
triplet loss based works [5], [60], (C + 1)-tuplet loss [61],
and C-pair loss objective [9]. However, we point out the work
like [2] cannot be privatized during the optimization because
it employs an iterative projection strategy (to positive/negative
pairwise labeling set) that will explicitly expose the pairwise
information. More importantly, if the learning model is neural
network based, we can follow the recipe provided by [45] to
simply replace the corresponding gradient sensitivity over a
lot instead of a batch.
Apart from DML, there are many other machine learning
algorithms that use pairwise data during training. Similar to
DML, constrained clustering methods have the better clustering
performance if a small number of pairwise labeled data is
offered. The pairwise data provide cannot-link or must-link
side information which is useful to adjust the clustering
structure. Thus the proposed DPP applies to this case. In
crowd-sourcing community, workers are allowed to pairwise
label their preferences. Suppose privacy concern for workers’
preference is desired, we can also define the pairwise privacy
for this kind of application.
IX. CONCLUSION
This is a pilot work aiming to preserve the privacy of
pairwise data for distance metric learning. From the view of
empirical risk minimization, this work, the first of its kind
in machine learning community, targets the input data that
are correlated. In the paper we first study how the pairwise
data could be leaked during training a distance metric learning
model, then and we propose a new privacy definition to
this problem. The key idea of our method is utilizing the
graph property to real the involved correlations, which helps
to construct the prior knowledge of the real-world attacker.
We claim this work is different from previous privacy on
graphs. Particularly, we clarify the connections between the
proposed privacy and two classical privacy definitions over
graph, edge differential privacy and node differential privacy.
Some interesting conclusions have been presented in the paper.
There are two interesting open problems that need further
exploration. One is how to design a general privacy imple-
mentation method that is not limited to the exact optimization
strategy. The other problem is how to use some database
statistics rather than pairwise data to do distance metric
learning, because it is expected have the higher utility.
APPENDIX A
AN EFFICIENT APPROACH FOR DERIVING THE κ IN EQ. (5)
According to Fig. 5 (IV), we find that the privacy for pair-
wise relationship and feature difference can be both eventually
attributed to the 1-hop neighbors of the target node, i.e. s
or t. Inspired by this observation, we present the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For a target pair (s, t), concerning the corre-
lation both on pairwise relationship and feature difference, we
have
|Pst|+ min{cs, ct} ≤ De(s)− Co+(s¯), (14)
where De(s) means the degree of s and Co+(s¯) represents
the increased number of components by removing s from G.
Particularly, the equality holds if and only if cs = ct.
Proof. If all the 1-hop neighbors of s are connected to t, there
must exist a node t′ ∈ V that causes De(s) edge-disjoint s-t′
paths, i.e. |Pst| ≤ |Pst′ | = De(s). Otherwise, |Pst| < De(s)
always holds. As a result, there are at most De(s) − |Pst|
edges that can provide feature inference of s. From the graph
theory, the increased number of components Co+(s¯) should
satisfy the equality Co+(s¯) = De(s)− |Pst| − cs. Due to the
fact that min (cs, ct) ≤ cs, we arrive at Eq. (14).
For all the possible pair, we have
κ′ = max
∀s∈V
{De(s)− Co+(s¯)}, (15)
where κ′ is a upper bound of κ in Eq. (5). As the component
number of a graph can be efficiently calculated, the whole time
complexity for searching κ′ isO(|V |(|V |+|E|)). Furthermore,
one can greedily search two connected nodes having the
maximum sum for the right part of Eq. (14) to force κ′ = κ.
More importantly, from Proposition 1, we instantly conclude
that DPP is upper bounded by the known Node DP [27].
Deleting a node in graph equals to removing all the edges
associated with this node. Thus, we have κ = max∀s∈V De(s)
from the view of Node DP. We conclude that the proposed DPP
is superior to Node DP. Particularly, if the derived graph is a
tree with large degree node, κ is 1 for DPP while κ is the
maximum node degree for Node DP.
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APPENDIX B
DPP FOR INTRANSITIVE RELATIONSHIP CASE
The intransitive relationship is a relaxed version of transitive
relationship. For the pairwise data with intransitive relation-
ship, we only need to consider the correlation on feature
difference. For a target pair 〈s, t〉, if s and t are mutually
1-hop neighbors, then there should be 1 + min(cs, ct) edges
that need to concern for the worst case, where cs and ct
is searched on the subgraph G − 〈s, t〉. Otherwise, only the
number of min(cs, ct) edges need concerning, where cs and ct
are searched over the entire graph. It is noted that the former
case equals to the transitive relationship when Pst = {(s, t)}.
For the latter case, similar to Proposition 1 we have
min(cs, ct) ≤ De(s)− Co+(s¯)− 1. (16)
This inequality follows the fact that cs = De(s)−Co+(s¯)−1.
One can define κ-neighboring graph of G now by assigning
the greater value of two cases to κ. Since the value of κ is
determined by the given pairwise data, edge DP cannot handle
this case.
APPENDIX C
SENSITIVITY SHRINKING FOR APPROXIMATE DPP
We first prepare the basic ingredients for approximate
DPP. Suppose the individual features are `2 normalized, i.e.
||xi||2 ≤ 1. We modify the `1-norm in Definitions 2 and 4
into `2-norm and draw noise Y from Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2Id) with σ ≥
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)∆g
 , which naturally updates
Definition 3 to be the approximate DP.
From the gradient function in Eq. (8), if y = 1, DW < m
we have
||gr(·)||2 = |1− m||W∆x||2 | · ||Wr∆x∆x
T ||2 ≤ 2m. (17)
Consequently, we have the following Corollary to calculate the
sensitivity for the approximate DPP by extending Theorem 2
(also refer to the right of Fig. 6).
Corollary 1. If the objective function in Eq. (7) is h-Lipschitz
(`2 norm) w.r.t Wr, the `2 gradient sensitivity ∆gr on any
batch B is at most κ(g′r+g′′r )|B| , where the batch gradient peak
g′r = max(||gr(p1)||2, ..., ||gr(p|B|)||2), and its possible coun-
terpart g′′r = min{h,max(4||Wr||2, 2m)}.
The benefit of concerning approximate DPP is that the
total privacy cost can be reduced by slightly increasing the
failure of probability of δ. Since the proposed DPP definition
is consistent with DP over structure, the advanced composition
theory in [36] is naturally inherited in our work. Furthermore,
we refer interested readers to [62] for a comparison of more
DP variants which provide improved composition theories.
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